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ABSTRACT 
This paper starts by examining the relationship between humanitarianism and human rights, arguing 
that human rights do not only exceed restrictive (e.g. medical-biological) interpretations of 
humanitarianism, but are also exceeded by broader (e.g. developmental) interpretations. 
Furthermore, it points out that the humanitarian arguments used instrumentally to justify restrictive 
(and often inhuman) border policies in the Mediterranean also include human rights concerns. The 
justificationist use of humanitarianism is exemplified through an analysis of the Italian military and 
humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum. Finally, the paper develops the argument made by Fassin 
and Ticktin about the relationship between compassion and rights, and about the inclusionary power 
of humanitarianism producing subaltern subject positions. By analysing resettlements from Libya 
and rescue operations carried out in international waters, the paper shows that humanitarian 
processes of differential and subaltern inclusion based on the victimization of migrants: a) are not 
limited to the territory of the destination country; b) do not only and necessarily go to the detriment 
of rights but can also go even beyond legal obligations.  
 
Introduction 
By focusing on the Central-Southern Mediterranean, this paper addresses three different issues 
regarding the humanitarian Mediterranean border. First, the paper analyses the meaning of 
humanitarianism and its relationship with human rights within the Mediterranean migration and 
border regime. Secondly, it analyses the Italian military and humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum 
and, more generally, Italian humanitarianized border policies and practices, to point out that 
humanitarianism is both a fig leaf used to legitimize exclusionary policies and practices and an 
instrument for the subordinate inclusion of migrants into the European space.  
In analysing such aspects of the Mediterranean humanitarian border, the paper tries to stress 
continuities and discontinuities with the work of Didier Fassin (2005, 2010, 2011) and Miriam 
Ticktin (2005, 2006, 2011). Fassin and Ticktin were among the first to point out the emergence of 
the humanitarian reason in migration management by analysing its increasing role in French 
policies. More particularly, they analysed the effects of the illness clause that was introduced in 
French immigration law in 1998. Such rule allowed authorities to grant residency status for 
humanitarian reasons to undocumented migrants affected by life-threatening pathologies who 
wouldn’t be able to receive appropriate health treatment in their home country. In the preceding 
years, restrictive norms on work immigration had been flanked by a sharp decrease of the 
recognition rates of asylum applications, based on the increasing suspicion against ‘bogus’ asylum 
seekers as well as on a negative attitude against ‘ordinary’ asylum seekers who were ‘only’ fleeing 
persecution. Importantly, the wide discretionary power enjoyed by both the medical offices and the 
members of the asylum commission resulted in moral sentiments to play a decisive role in the 
procedure to grant a residency permit based on the illness clause (Ticktin 2006) and in the asylum 
procedure alike (Ticktin 2005), with the refugee status being mainly granted to people who were in 
particularly exceptional and moving situations rather than to the ‘ordinary’ politically persecuted. 
Thus, asylum was degraded from a political to a compassion issue: “[t]he recognition of the refugee 
 2 
status by European nations appears as an act of generosity on the part of a national community 
towards a ‘suffering stranger’ rather than the fulfillment of a political debt toward ‘citizens of 
humanity’” (Fassin 2005:376), and it privileges innocent, apolitical and non-agentive victims 
(Ticktin 2005) deserving pity rather than solidarity. Thus, while the main doors of work migration 
and asylum are almost completely closed by restrictive laws and administrative practices, a small 
window can still be opened by compassion. 
Although Fassin and Ticktin use the term ‘compassion’, they both fail to conceptualize it as a 
specific form of humanitarianism and to clarify the relationship between humanitarianism and 
human rights. Instead, they end up opposing humanitarianism to human rights. Instead, this paper 
suggests that the human rights discourse is a constitutive component of the discourse that 
established the humanitarian Mediterranean border. 
Humanitarianism at large can, on the one hand, serve to mask the restrictive character of 
immigration policies and end up limiting the effectiveness of human rights, as pointed out by Fassin 
and Ticktin, but, on the other hand, it can also open up new avenues for migrants, going beyond 
what the mere respect of human rights would grant them. Importantly, processes of humanitarian 
inclusion also occur outside the state’s territory (not only inside it, as shown by Fassin and Ticktin) 
and in the absence of legal responsibilities for the relevant state towards the people involved (not 
only as a consequence of specific legal obligations). 
 
The relationship between humanitarianism and human rights 
William Walters (2011:151) has argued that one axis for knowing the humanitarian border “is 
constituted by certain forms of legal know-how. This is manifested in the numerous ways in which 
the border is documented as a regime which is violating certain norms of treatment and denying 
certain rights to migrants”. Moreover, “the humanitarian border is configured as a sociolegal space, 
and its subjects governed if not as, then certainly in the image of rights-bearing individuals”. 
Human rights are therefore to be seen – according to Walters – as an essential component of the 
humanitarian border. Along the same lines, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013:175) write that 
“humaneness implies a certain humanitarianism that might be claimed by policing borders 
according to UN protocols or observing principles of human rights”. 
The relationship between humanitarianism and human rights, however, is not as easy and 
straightforward as it may seem, and there are diverging opinions about the meaning of 
humanitarianism (Perkowski 2014; Pallister-Wilkins 2015). According to Fassin (2009:50), 
“humanitarianism is not about human rights in general, but about the right to live in particular: 
saving lives is its higher mission”. While such an interpretation of humanitarianism is, of course, 
legitimate as an individual approach (and even more in an article, like the above-cited one, whose 
aim is to analyse the place of life and death in the Foucauldian concept of biopower), it shouldn’t be 
generalized and absolutized. 
Indeed, the history of humanitarianism shows that “[t]here is no ‘objective’ definition of 
humanitarian action” (Calhoun 2008:73). On the one hand, there would be some reason to support 
the view that sees humanitarianism as limited to the rescuing of life and the provision of immediate 
relief in situations of emergency: the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in 1863 is often indicated as the starting point of modern (that is institutionalized and 
internationalized) humanitarianism (Barnett and Weiss 2011; Davey 2013), and the ICRC was 
established only to provide neutral, impartial and independent first aid and care to the victims of 
armed conflicts. In the same period, however, many charitable associations and boards were also 
created with the aim “to manage poor relief, sanitation, hospitals, and other projects” (Calhoun 
2008:79). The activities of such (non-state) organizations went far beyond saving lives and 
providing immediate relief to suffering bodies. In sum, it can be argued that “[h]umanitarianism 
took root in the modern world not as a response to war or ‘emergencies’ but as part of an effort to 
remake the world so that it better served the interests of humanity” (Calhoun 2008:76). Even 
“[m]any of today’s best-known aid organizations […] that do more than provide emergency 
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assistance began as single-minded relief agencies but soon discovered that relief was not enough 
[…]. Many organizations now aspire to transform the structural conditions that endanger 
populations because saving individuals today makes little sense if they are in jeopardy tomorrow” 
(Barnett and Weiss 2011:11-12). Indeed, the scope of the activities of many humanitarian 
organizations was expanded during the twentieth century, and it’s no coincidence that this happened 
simultaneously with the gradual establishment of an international human rights regime. Now, the 
activities of such organizations often include both short-term emergency relief and long-term 
development projects that have much more structural and ambitious aims.1 Moreover, many 
humanitarian organizations explicitly include the protection and/or promotion of human rights 
among their main objectives2 or mention them as one of the indirect (and desired) results of their 
action. Even the ICRC, while describing itself as “an impartial, neutral and independent 
organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims 
of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance […,] also 
endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal 
humanitarian principles” (ICRC 2009). 
Besides showing that even the ICRC’s scope is in fact broader than it was at the time of its 
foundation, insofar as it also includes activities for the prevention of suffering, this quote also 
reminds us of the existence of international humanitarian law. Humanitarian law regulates the 
conduct of warfare (jus in bello, as opposed to jus ad bellum, which instead determines the criteria 
and legitimate reasons for engaging in war) with specific regard to the need to protect civilian 
people and infrastructure and to treat war prisoners humanely. The aim of humanitarian law goes, 
thus, beyond the obligation to rescue human lives and provide immediate relief. Moreover, the 
ambiguity with which concerns about the risk of ‘genocide’ have been mixed up with those about 
‘massive human rights violations’ in order to justify the so-called ‘humanitarian wars’ that have 
been waged in the post-Cold War era also suggests that humanitarianism and human rights can 
hardly be kept separated, if at all (Kennedy 2004). 
Furthermore, the roots of modern humanitarianism can also be traced in earlier phases of the 
Westphalian order, and even in its gestational phase: “[c]olonialism itself was often understood 
(with no cynicism) as humanitarian” (Calhoun 2008:78). Indeed, “humanitarian ideas appeared also 
as part of the rationale for colonialism. Humanitarianism was often part of the ‘civilization’ that 
colonial powers sought to bring to the peoples they conquered” (Calhoun 2010:39). Importantly, the 
criticism of colonialism based on the doctrine of human rights and made by authors like Francisco 
de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas did not aim to put an end to colonialism but rather to 
humanize it. Therefore, it can be argued that the doctrine of human rights was part of the 
humanitarian justification of colonialism as a civilization mission.  
Finally, the rooting of natural law in different religious traditions, and, more specifically, the jus-
naturalist interpretation of human rights as God-given in the Christian tradition disprove the 
argument made by Ticktin (2006) that distinguishes humanitarianism from human rights based on 
the respective origins (religious for the first, secular for the latter). Incidentally, the other argument 
made by Ticktin (2006:35) is that “human-rights institutions are largely grounded in law […], 
whereas humanitarianism is more about the ethical and moral imperative to bring relief to those 
suffering and to save lives”. While it is a truism to say that human rights are largely grounded in 
law (indeed, they are law), it would be wrong to see them as opposed to moral imperatives: human 
rights (and law, in general) are rather the positivization of moral imperatives, and their codification, 
interpretation and implementation change over time and space also as a result of differences and 
transformations in the dominant morality. However, it is true that different coalescences of 
humanitarianism can be identified. According to Redfield and Bornstein (2010), three are more 
clearly visible: a medical one aimed at saving lives and relieving physical and psychological pain, a 
legal one focused on rights as a tool for humanitarian aims, and an economic-developmental one 
focused on removing the main root causes of suffering. And yet, these distinctions should be 
thought of “as historical orientations, trajectories, and tendencies rather than categorical certainties” 
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(Redfield and Bornstein 2010:6), or as “rivers [that] share a headwater and have flowed into each 
other over the decades” (Barnett 2011:16). Furthermore, and importantly, not even these three 
streams cover the entire range of meaning of humanitarianism. Arguably, humanitarianism at large 
simply means following the ‘golden rule’, which, incidentally, also includes the principle of 
hospitality. 
Having said this, the work done by Fassin and Ticktin is important because it addresses the 
relationship between humanitarianism and human rights by stressing the fact that rights are being 
gradually moved from the political to the compassion sphere. I will come back to this issue later, in 
order to discuss and further develop the analysis initiated by Fassin and Ticktin. 
 
Humanitarianism and human rights in the language of policy-makers 
The previous section has shown that there are good reasons for considering human rights as part 
and parcel of humanitarianism, and humanitarianism as something that goes beyond the moral (or 
even legal) obligation to save human lives and give first relief to people who are in urgent need of 
medical care. Human rights exceed the strictest interpretation of humanitarianism as limited to 
saving lives and provide immediate relief to the suffering caused by emergencies. However, human 
rights are, in turn, also exceeded by a broader interpretation of humanitarianism as aimed at 
combating poverty and exclusion, at promoting the well-being of mankind and at treating others the 
way we would want to be treated ourselves. 
In this section I show that there is also a specific reason for addressing the human rights issue – and 
not only the issue of border deaths and the provision of emergency care – when analysing the 
humanitarianization of the EU external border. Indeed, both the part of the humanitarian discourse 
focusing on the need to save human lives (what we could call the minimalist interpretation of 
humanitarianism) and the part focused on human rights at large have contributed to the same 
discursive process that has accompanied the evolution of the European migration and border regime 
in the last fifteen years. In such period, European institutions (at both state and EU level) have 
increasingly tried to use humanitarian concerns to justify the established migration and border 
regime. While such regime was characterized from the beginning by strong criticism based on 
humanitarian reasons, policymakers, think-tanks, security professionals, experts and technocrats 
involved in the management of migration gradually appropriated (Fassin 2007:154), recoded and 
used the very same arguments to legitimize it. Importantly, they did this by focusing not only on the 
need to save the human lives of undocumented travellers (typically at risk of dying while trying to 
cross the Mediterranean) or relieve the suffering of the survivors of fatal journeys, but also on the 
need to protect their human rights. 
At the EU level, the humanitarianization of the sea border can be first traced in official documents 
to late 2004. At that time the stress was put on the need to save human lives. In July that year, the 
shipmaster and the first officer of the humanitarian ship Cap Anamur, as well as the head of the 
organization owning the ship and bearing the same name, were all detained and prosecuted under 
the charge of aiding and abetting illegal immigration because they had rescued 37 migrants in the 
Strait of Sicily and brought them to an Italian port.3 This prompted a debate about border deaths in 
the Mediterranean, and the German Interior Minister, Otto Schily, proposed the establishment of 
European reception camps for asylum seekers in North Africa, arguing that this would also prevent 
casualties during the sea crossing. A measure aimed at keeping migrants at bay was thus presented 
as a measure aimed at saving their lives. The proposal was never formalised at EU level. However, 
the European Council of November 2004 expressed ‘its utmost concern about the human tragedies 
that take place in the Mediterranean’ and called ‘upon all States to intensify their cooperation in 
preventing further loss of life’ (Council of the European Union 2004). Since then, the need to save 
lives has been regularly mentioned by EU policy documents on migration, and rescuing migrants at 
sea has become, besides combating illegal immigration, the main declared objective of EU border 
control strategies (Council of the European Union 2006; European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2013). Vibrant calls for determined action to “prevent the loss of lives at sea” 
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came from the EU Council after the two deadliest tragedies ever occurred in the post-war 
Mediterranean history, which both took place in the Strait of Sicily on 3 October 2013 and 18 April 
2015 respectively (Council of the European Union 2013, 2015). 
In Italy, instead, the humanitarianization of the border had already become visible in 2002. The 
amendments made to the Italian immigration law that year introduced stricter penalties for 
smugglers if the lives or physical safety of the smuggled persons have been put at risk during the 
smuggling process, and if the smuggled persons have been subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment. By doing this, the Italian legislator seemed to aim at enhancing the safety of irregular 
travels in general, by protecting not only the right to life, but also the right to physical integrity, the 
right to be treated humanely, and the right not to be tortured. Gradually, human rights became a 
crucial issue for justifying the restrictive border regime. In 2003, the cooperation agreement signed 
by the Italian government with Gadhafi’s Libya was heavily criticized, both internally and 
internationally, because of the well-founded fear that increased cooperation with the Libyan regime 
would result in increasing violations of migrants’ human rights. However, the agreement was 
publicly justified with the “strong determination to jointly tackle criminal organisations devoted to 
the smuggling of human beings and the merciless exploitation of clandestine migrants” (Ministero 
dell’Interno 2003b). Indeed, smugglers often subject their customers to violence and inhuman and 
degrading treatments, and not only Italian authorities, but also those of other EU countries soon 
realized that “the hardships migrants face can be turned around to label control measures protective 
and benevolent” (Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011:55). More recently, after over 700 people 
died on 18 April 2015, the Italian prime minister, Matteo Renzi, said migrant smuggling amounts to 
“the slavery of the 21st century” and labelled the smugglers as “the new slave traders” (Bbc.com 
2015). I won’t linger here on the contradictory comparison between the slaves, who were deported 
and forced to cross the ocean against their will (yet ‘regularly’), and the present-day migrants, who 
by all means want to cross the Mediterranean but are not allowed to travel regularly. What I want to 
stress here is that comparing smugglers to slave traders explicitly addresses not only the right to life 
but also other human rights such as personal freedom, freedom from exploitation, and, again, the 
right to physical integrity and the right to be treated humanely. 
Human rights are also at the core of what could be called the ‘humanitarian turn’ of the EU border 
agency Frontex, which was created in 2004, became operational in 2005 and launched its first 
border patrol mission in 2006. A number of studies (Perkowski 2012, 2014; Slominski 2013; 
Campesi 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2014) have documented a drastic increase of humanitarian 
rhetoric in Frontex’ regulations and policy documents, as well as in the self-presentation of the 
agency. As a first step, the EU border agency made an agreement with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2008. In 2010, specific rules for sea border operations 
were introduced, according to which all activities must be conducted in compliance with 
fundamental rights, also including the principle of non-refoulement, and Frontex border guards 
must be trained with regard to relevant human rights and refugee law as well as to the international 
regime on search and rescue. In 2011, the border agency adopted a Code of Conduct and a 
Fundamental Rights Strategy. Finally, Frontex instituted the post of the Fundamental Rights Officer 
(FRO) as well as a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights (CFFR) in 2012. While Frontex has 
also increasingly stressed its role as saviour of lives (Perkowski 2012:22, 2014: 5-6; Aas and 
Gundhus 2014:5), the humanitarianization of the EU border agency has been especially focused on 
the respect of human rights in general and of the principle of non-refoulement in particular. This 
discursive turn was necessary in order to defend Frontex from the accusation of being inhumane. As 
says Feldman (2012:83), in order “[t]o justify the [migration] apparatus in humanitarian terms, EU 
officials speak fluently in the language of human rights”. 
 
Humanitarian justificationism 
The instrumental use of humanitarianism is best exemplified by the Italian operation Mare 
Nostrum. From 18 October 2013 to 31 December 2014 a number of vessels, helicopters, airplanes, 
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drones and personnel of the Italian Navy, Army, Air Force, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, Coast 
Guard and Police continuously patrolled the international waters of the Strait of Sicily, in search for 
migrants to be rescued, within the Mare Nostrum framework. The mission was launched 
immediately after the Lampedusa tragedy of 3 October 2013, when 366 people drowned only half a 
mile before reaching the Italian island. As a response, the Italian government launched Mare 
Nostrum and presented it as a military and humanitarian mission, whose declared aim was both to 
save human lives and to intensify border control. As time went by, however, the stress was put 
more and more on the humanitarian side of the mission. Because of its life-saving goal, Mare 
Nostrum was praised and supported not only by almost all Italian political parties (the only criticism 
coming from a part of the opposition accusing it of attracting more migrants, and therefore also 
increasing the absolute number of casualties), but also by humanitarian organizations such as 
Amnesty International, Médecins sans Frontières and the UNHCR, which called on the Italian and 
European institutions not to reduce the search and rescue capacity in the Mediterranean when the 
Italian government announced that Mare Nostrum would end because of financial constraints in 
October 2014, only a year after its launch. In the end, Mare Nostrum was stopped on 31 December 
2014, after around 177,000 people had been rescued, and its name remained the symbol of 
humanitarian border management. After the shipwreck of 18 April 2015, which caused the death of 
an estimated 700 people, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) requested the 
resumption of Mare Nostrum, while the UNHCR and the European Parliament called for a 
European Mare Nostrum-like humanitarian rescue operation. 
To deconstruct the picture of a good-hearted and innovative humanitarian mission, it must be first 
reminded that, besides the thousands of migrants rescued, Italian authorities also boast about the 
hundreds of smugglers detained within the mission. Indeed, navy ships have been used to identify 
people, to interrogate them and to detect smugglers: in order to do this, not only military personnel 
but also police officers have been on board. Furthermore, Mare Nostrum aircraft and vessels were 
part and parcel of the operational cooperation framework that has long been established between 
Italy and North African countries (Cuttitta 2008, 2014a; Cassarino 2010; Bialasiewicz 2012). 
Within such framework, based on the provision of training programmes and technical equipment, 
on practical cooperation and exchange of information, migrant boats have been also intercepted and 
forcibly returned by the border guards of North African countries, while thousands of people have 
been prevented from departing. 
The operational cooperation between Italy and North African countries in maritime border control 
began in the 1990s and is, therefore, not a novelty. Military vessels and aircraft carrying out both 
rescue missions and security activities were not a novelty either, when Mare Nostrum was 
launched. In October 2013 the Italian government opted less for a qualitative than for a quantitative 
change, by strongly increasing the already existing patrolling activities. Before the launch of Mare 
Nostrum, indeed, Italian military vessels and aircraft had been patrolling the Strait of Sicily within 
the operation Constant Vigilance since 2004. While Constant Vigilance was never presented as a 
‘humanitarian mission’, Mare Nostrum only (yet significantly) increased the number of vessels, 
aircraft and personnel deployed in the framework of the previous operation: the estimated cost of 
Mare Nostrum was around 9.5 million Euro per month, whereas the monthly budget of Constant 
Vigilance was only 1.5 million Euro per month. In quantitative terms there was a big difference, but 
in qualitative terms – in terms of what Italian authorities actually did – there was hardly a 
difference, because Constant Vigilance was also engaged in both rescue missions and security 
activities. Moreover, if we go further back in time, we realize that military vessels and police 
vessels started patrolling the international waters of the Strait of Sicily as early as 1995. From the 
beginning, Italian border guards were confronted with the duty to rescue people: in 1997, they 
claimed that they were not able to forcibly divert migrant boats back to Tunisia, because migrants 
sinking their own vessels resulted in the legal obligation for authorities to rescue them and bring 
them to Italy (Comitato parlamentare Schengen-Europol 1997). Then, from 2002 onwards, the 
number of navy ships involved in migration controls was increased. Importantly, at that time the 
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emphasis was mainly put on security, not on humanitarian concerns. However, migrants were still 
‘rescued’, first, and then brought to Italy, except in the few cases in which Tunisia accepted to take 
migrants back from international waters, upon the request of Italian authorities that first intercepted 
the migrants and then contacted their Tunisian counterparts. In 2003, a governmental decree was 
issued to regulate i.a. the “continuous patrolling activities” of Italian navy ships and aircraft in 
international waters. The decree specified that activities tackling irregular migration must always 
aim at “safeguarding human life and respecting human dignity” (Ministero dell’Interno 2003a). 
Then, after the launch of Constant Vigilance, the activities didn’t change significantly: according to 
governmental guidelines, the priority of interceptions was always rescuing lives (Consiglio dei 
Ministri 2005). Even in 2011, when arrivals to Southern Italy drastically increased in the wake of 
the Arab Spring, saving lives “was at the top in the hierarchy of priorities […], at that time maybe 
in daily operational activities more than in the public discourse” (Pastore and Roman 2014). With 
regard to the geographical extent of patrolling activities, Mare Nostrum has surely covered on a 
more regular basis the area bordering Libyan national waters. Not even this, however, is actually a 
novelty: Italian navy aircraft or ships often spotted vessels and carried out rescue interventions 
close to the Libyan maritime boundary also in the past, and they kept doing this even after Mare 
Nostrum was stopped. 
In sum, there was a continuity in qualitative terms as regards the engagement of Italian authorities 
in rescuing migrants in distress at sea, in spite of the humanitarian rhetoric that surrounded the 
Mare Nostrum mission, presenting it as something new. After all, humanitarian institutions have 
long played an important role in migration and border management (at both global and local level): 
the most obvious examples are the obligation to rescue lives and the principle of non-refoulement 
(especially after its codification through the 1951 UN refugee convention and its 1967 protocol). 
What has changed in the course of time is less the fact that such principles have been respected 
(although they have been also disregarded, at times, as pointed out in the next section) than the fact 
that respecting them has been increasingly publicized in order to present the European migration 
and border regime as a good-hearted one, while in fact it is still aimed at limiting the freedoms and 
rights of large numbers of people. Indeed, the humanitarian character of Mare Nostrum was not 
novel within the framework of Italian sea border controls, instead innovations were apparent in 
intelligence, most notably the identification procedure and the fact that migrants were sometimes 
held on board for several days before they were brought to land, thus turning navy ships to floating 
detention centres. The humanitarian rhetoric about the life-saving aim of Mare Nostrum was thus an 
instrumental move for making restrictive border control policies and practices acceptable to a public 
opinion that was increasingly shocked by the high death toll at the Mediterranean border. 
This is not to say that all politics is cynical and humanitarian action at the EU borders is simply a 
fake. Indeed, Edelman (1992: 21-22) has explained that the construction of the ‘political spectacle’ 
“is not necessarily self-conscious or deliberately deceptive”, and Goffman (1959) has shown that 
much of what is staged in everyday life is less the result of a director’s orchestration than the 
mechanical repetition of routine acts. This also applies to migration and border controls as well as 
to the Mediterranean humanitarian border. 
 
The exclusionary power of humanitarianism 
What remained hidden behind the humanitarian veil of Mare Nostrum was the inhuman nature of 
the Euro-African migration and border regime that the Italian military operation was contributing to 
strengthen. The humanitarian character of Mare Nostrum was best exemplified by the respect of the 
right to life and the right to asylum: people were rescued and brought to Italy; there, those entitled 
to apply for asylum were allowed to do so, while the others were detained and, if possible, 
repatriated. The dominant representation of the Mare Nostrum period is the picture of a humane and 
orderly management of migration carried out by state authorities as opposed to the wild inhumanity 
of smugglers. However, this attitude was not new for the Italian authorities. Under the second Prodi 
government (2006-2008), for example, Italy put a great effort into presenting its border policy as 
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humane. This was done by stopping the unlawful deportations to Libya that had been carried out by 
the previous government between October 2004 and January 2006, as well as by establishing a 
cooperation with UNHCR, IOM and the Italian Red Cross (CRI) on Lampedusa to make sure 
human rights would be respected on the island (Cuttitta 2014b). At the same time, however, the 
Italian government strengthened cooperation with the police of Libya and other North African 
countries, with the aim to prevent people from crossing the Mediterranean. By dispatching liaison 
officers to the Italian embassies, Italian police kept supporting their North African colleagues in 
controlling their borders. This resulted in thousands of people being prevented from leaving or 
apprehended by the border guards of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, either in national or in 
international waters, and forcibly returned to North African ports. From there, many people where 
then forcibly repatriated in breach of the principle of non-refoulement, many others were forced to 
remain in countries in which they would be exposed to gross human rights violations (e.g. unlawful 
detention, torture, inhuman and degrading treatments, refoulement, no effective judicial remedy), as 
documented by several reports of human rights organizations (see among others: Human Rights 
Watch 2008, 2014; Jesuit Refugee Service Europe 2012; Amnesty International 2013, 2015). 
Even during Mare Nostrum, Italy kept providing the police authorities of North African countries 
with aid programmes (offering training courses for border guards as well as funding for the 
construction of border police facilities) and technological equipment (all-terrain vehicles, patrol 
boats, night vision devices, instruments for the detection of false and falsified documents). In 2013, 
also the EU started a two-year border and assistance mission (EU-BAM) in Libya, with the aim to 
train and advise Libyan authorities. Before, during and after Mare Nostrum, thousands of people 
have been forced to remain in (or have been forcibly returned to) Libya and other North African 
countries by the local authorities. Before, during and after Mare Nostrum, the primary aim of Italian 
and European policies has been to prevent people from arriving to Europe, where most of them 
would be granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, and many others would be able to 
remain irregularly as undocumented migrants. 
A number of studies (among others Rijpma and Cremona 2007; Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010; 
McNamara 2013) have shown how the externalization of border controls aims at relieving European 
states from legal responsibilities. Indeed, despite significant exceptions (in 2012, Italy was 
condemned by the European Court of Human Rights for pushing back Somali and Eritrean migrants 
to Libya in 2009), legal responsibilities for actions carried out directly by European countries have 
been successfully circumvented by outsourcing the ‘dirty job’ to third countries that are not 
subjected to any international court. However, while it has been argued that legal responsibilities 
might arise also for indirect action – e.g. in the case of outsourced push-backs (Giuffré 2013) –, the 
humanitarian character of Mare Nostrum can be questioned not only because of its indirect 
consequences on those who were immobilized in North Africa, but also in the light of the activities 
directly carried out within the Italian operation. Even if there were dead migrants on board or 
people reportedly missing, Italian police authorities on Mare Nostrum vessels primarily interrogated 
migrants as to their own identity and tried to gather information useful for arresting presumptive 
smugglers, while abstaining from any investigation activity that could have helped to identify the 
dead or missing people. Generally speaking, the fact that state authorities regularly collect 
information and compile statistics regarding the apprehension of live migrants, while they don’t 
collect or disclose to the public systematic data on border deaths (Last and Spijkerboer 2014), is an 
indicator of their ambiguous attitude towards humanitarian issues, if we only consider the high 
humanitarian relevance of identifying the dead (Grant 2011; Kovras and Robins forthcoming). In 
the specific case of Mare Nostrum, it suggests that the security aims of the Italian operation still 
outweighed the humanitarian ones. Importantly, the identification of live migrants was often 
achieved through the unlawful use of force (Asgi 2014). This had been the case already before 
Mare Nostrum (Feliziani 2014), but things didn’t change during the humanitarian mission: human 
rights were violated by Italian authorities both on board the navy vessels (Borderline Europe 2014) 
and upon arrival on the mainland (Escapes 2014).4 
 9 
 
The inclusionary power of humanitarianism 
Pointing only to the fact that humanitarianism has become a fig leaf for exclusionary policies and 
practices would overlook its inclusionary power. Indeed, human rights “are increasingly becoming 
a key component in migration and border regimes worldwide” insofar as they play “just as much a 
role in establishing the conditions under which border crossing can be blocked or slowed as those 
under which it is facilitated” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:175-176). Albeit within the status quo of 
a restrictive border regime (which, incidentally, it didn’t challenge but rather reinforce), Mare 
Nostrum as such protected and enforced the right to life of those who were trying to cross the 
Mediterranean by permanently expanding the geographical extent of border patrols as well as by 
increasing them. Thus, the Italian operation went beyond the need to comply with human rights 
obligations. In order to respect the duty to rescue people in distress, it was not necessary for Italian 
authorities to permanently deploy their vessels and aircraft in international waters. Maritime border 
controls could have been easily limited to the edges of Italian territorial waters, and rescue 
interventions on the high seas carried out only ‘on demand’, in response to distress calls. Thus, 
many people would have died unnoticed (because unable to successfully send a distress call) and 
many others would have lost their lives because the fewer vessels available would have needed 
more time to reach the place of the incident, but Italy wouldn’t have been liable for any human 
rights violation. Furthermore, and more importantly, the Italian mission, by stretching the reach of 
patrol activities up to the borders of Tunisian and Libyan national waters, did not only contribute to 
saving lives: indeed, rescued people were also brought to Italian territory and funnelled into the 
Italian reception system. This resulted either in the rescued to be granted residency status as 
refugees, or in their illegalization (and then either in their deportation or in their subaltern inclusion 
as ‘illegals’). Therefore, saving lives under Mare Nostrum also meant including rescued people into 
the Italian and European polity. Their inclusion was based on a humanitarian gesture – expanding 
the reach of patrol operations to the utmost southern part of the high seas in order to rescue people – 
that went (from a legal perspective) beyond human rights obligations and was delocalized (from a 
geographical perspective) outside Italian territory and into international waters. To a lesser extent, 
this was and still is also the case of Italian maritime border controls before and after Mare Nostrum. 
Although the difference between Mare Nostrum and previous Italian operations was much less 
qualitative than quantitative, it must be stressed that Mare Nostrum enhanced the rescue capacities 
and made the Italian policy of patrolling international waters not only more effective but also much 
more visible. 
Another example helps to understand the inclusionary power of delocalized humanitarian border 
management beyond human rights obligations. In 2007 Italy launched its first resettlement action 
ever. This followed calls from the UNHCR and from the Eritrean diaspora in Italy in the summer of 
2007, as well as a parliamentary question posed in October that year, all asking the Italian 
government to allow the entry of around 600 Eritrean refugees who were being held in the Libyan 
detention centre of Misratah. Between 2007 and 2008, around 70 of them were resettled to 
Cantalice, a small town in Central Italy. In the first group of 39, there were “26 lone women and 2 
unaccompanied minors” (Ministero dell’Interno 2007), which suggests that the main criterion used 
to select refugees for resettlement was to pick those who are or are generally perceived to be the 
most innocent and vulnerable. For Italy, there was no obligation under international law to grant 
those people access to Italian territory. By accepting to resettle a number of refugees, Italy took 
humanitarian action going beyond human rights obligations.5 Importantly, this was a sharp turn 
away from previous policies. The second Berlusconi government (2001-2005) had not simply 
turned a blind eye to unlawful returns from Libya but it had also actively supported them, e.g. by 
financing return flights to Asmara to repatriate Eritrean refugees (European Commission 2004:61), 
who were thus exposed to the risk of persecution. Following the strong criticism from domestic 
opposition as well as from international institutional actors and human rights organizations, such 
policy was not continued, and Libya was also asked to refrain from violating the non-refoulement 
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principle. Another case of resettlement occurred in March 2011, at the outbreak of the Libya war, 
when the Italian government, as a response to calls from the Italian Refugee Council (CIR), the 
association Habeshia and the Bishop of Tripoli to evacuate the around 2000 Eritreans who were 
exposed to violence in the Libyan capital, decided to resettle just 108 of them (Puccio and De 
Donato 2013). 
Also with such resettlement actions, like with Mare Nostrum, Italy anticipated its compliance to 
human rights obligations in time and space, by allowing access to its territory and granting 
protection status to a number of persons towards whom it bore no responsibility under international 
law. The inclusion of the Eritrean refugees into the Italian territory and polity took place as a result 
of a delocalization of humanitarian principles that went beyond human rights obligations. 
There are some differences that deserve to be stressed between the permanent deployment of patrol 
boats on the high seas and resettlement schemes. Rescue missions are carried out permanently, and 
the number of people that can be saved and brought to Italy is potentially unlimited. The Italian 
resettlement actions, instead, were ad hoc measures taken at specific times and for a very limited 
number of beneficiaries. Both permanent rescue missions in international waters and resettlement 
schemes, however, can be analysed from the perspective used by Fassin and Ticktin. 
While it must be borne in mind that resettlement can also be used instrumentally as an alternative to 
asylum proper, with a view to limiting the number of incoming refugees (van Selm 2003), the 
Italian gesture, taken in itself, is undoubtedly an act of generosity (albeit a small one), and it 
privileges those (women, children) who are perceived as the most endangered but also as the most 
unspoilt and passive (while leaving out the others). Yet, there are two differences with the cases 
illustrated by Fassin and Ticktin. The first is that Italy had no legal responsibility towards the 
persons that were resettled: it was responsible neither for their asylum procedure nor for their rights 
being respected in Libya. The second difference is that, while those cases regard French policies 
and practices in France, here compassion stretches out geographically to reach the territories of 
transit countries like Libya. The same can be said about Mare Nostrum rescue interventions, with 
the Italian authorities going beyond their legal obligations as well as beyond the borders of Italian 
territorial waters, and bringing to land people who can be presented as vulnerable and helpless 
human beings over whom state institutions have the power of life and death, or at least of inclusion 
and exclusion, of acceptance and rejection. 
Albahari (2006) argued that the death of migrants at sea “is partly a ritualized spectacle through 
which the state confirms, reinforces, and performs
 
its power over its own citizen subjects”. 
Arguably, the same can be said about the life of migrants, about the gesture of rescuing people at 
sea. Indeed, the Latin title of the Italian operation inspires a link with the ancient Romans, whose 
habits regarding the power of fathers towards the new-born show some similarities with Mare 
Nostrum. Once the baby was delivered, the Roman father had the power to accept or refuse it, with 
acceptance – which resulted in the duty to raise the baby within the familia – being symbolically 
communicated through the spectacularized gesture of lifting it in the air. Given the high level of 
(state-driven) mediatisation of Mare Nostrum,6 the spectacularized gesture of rescuing people at sea 
is comparable to that of lifting the new-born. The difference is that the rejected are, in the case of 
Mare Nostrum, unknown to the father, or they have fallen victims to ‘miscarriages’ resulting from 
carelessness and indifference (Fekete 2009:94-96; Heller, Pezzani and Situ Studio 2012; Squire 
2014; Basaran 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has contributed to the scholarly debate on the relationship between humanitarianism and 
migration management from different perspectives such as the meaning of humanitarianism, its 
relationship with human rights, its exclusionary and inclusionary power, its ability to create 
subordinate subject positions. 
The introduction has summarized Fassin’s and Ticktin’s approach to such questions, while the 
following sections of the paper have analysed the evolution of border controls at the Central-
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Southern Mediterranean EU border, highlighting continuities and discontinuities with the 
conclusions drawn by Fassin and Ticktin. 
First, this paper has addressed the relationship between humanitarianism and human rights by 
arguing that human rights do not only exceed the restrictive interpretation of humanitarianism as 
limited to the right to life, but are also exceeded by a broader interpretation of humanitarianism as 
aimed at preventing poverty, suffering and injustice, thus promoting the well-being of mankind.  
The paper has then focused on the Mediterranean. First, it has argued that human rights should be 
seen as an essential component of the humanitarianization of the Mediterranean migration and 
border regime, since the humanitarian arguments used instrumentally to justify restrictive (and often 
inhuman) border policies also include human rights concerns.  
Secondly, the paper has analysed Mare Nostrum, the quintessential embodiment of the 
Mediterranean humanitarian border, and pointed out that not only was the Italian military and 
humanitarian operation embedded in a framework of cooperation aimed at delocalizing (rather than 
eliminating) inhumanity (and Mare Nostrum bore therefore indirect responsibilities for the inhuman 
effects of the Mediterranean border regime), but it was also directly involved in human rights 
violations. This confirms the justificationist function of humanitarianism as well as the fact that 
humanitarian and securitarian logics are not incompatible but rather contribute jointly to enforcing 
the European migration and border regime (Aradau 2004; Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011; 
Aas and Gundhus 2014; Williams 2014, 2015). 
Furthermore, the paper – moving beyond the mere insight that humanitarianism is not incompatible 
with policing borders, and that humanitarian and securitarian discourses and practices are not 
mutually exclusive but rather support each other in enforcing the border – has further developed the 
argument made by Fassin and Ticktin about the increasing role of compassion in restrictive 
migration policies and practices, about the relationship between compassion and rights, and about 
the inclusionary power of humanitarianism producing subaltern subject positions.  
Humanitarianism, indeed, is not only an exclusionary (Williams 2015) but also an inclusionary 
strategy. However, resettlements from Libya and rescue operations carried out in international 
waters show that humanitarian processes of differential and subaltern inclusion based on the 
victimization of migrants: a) are not limited to the territory of the destination country but can also 
occur on the high seas as well as in the territories of third countries; b) do not only and necessarily 
go to the detriment of rights but can also go even beyond legal obligations. 
Finally, the paper confirms that humanitarian inclusion ends up strengthening the perception of 
migrants as fragile and powerless subjects (the endangered lives saved at sea; the women and 
children that are the privileged beneficiaries of resettlements). Such people can the more be seen as 
innocent and unspoilt subjects, the more they are presented as the victims of a context of 
exploitation matching the image of non-Western countries and of their inhabitants as backward and 
therefore lacking an adequate culture of human rights and sense of humanity. From this latter 
perspective, the humanitarianization of the Mediterranean border through the increasing rhetoric of 
humanitarian values and norms can also be linked with the postcolonial representation of Europe 
“as a ‘force for good’ in the world, whose internal values presumably drive its external conduct as 
well” (Bialasiewicz 2011:300) and as a global actor that tries to consolidate its dominant position 
towards its neighbours within asymmetrical relationships (Walters 2009). 
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1 Oxfam International, for example, was founded in 1942 as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, campaigning “for 
food supplies to be sent through an allied naval blockade to starving women and children in enemy-occupied Greece”. 
Today, “[a]s well as becoming a world leader in the delivery of emergency relief, Oxfam International implements 
long-term development programs in vulnerable communities”, and it declares its explicit and ambitious aim to change 
the world: “One person in three in the world lives in poverty. Oxfam is determined to change that world by mobilizing 
the power of people against poverty” (http://www.oxfam.org). Similarly, Care works “with local, national and 
international governments to support and enact policies that address the underlying causes of poverty” 
(http://www.care.org/work). 
2 According to Care, “[a]ll people, everywhere in the world, have the right to a life of dignity. This means a life free 
from poverty, violence, discrimination or human rights violations” (http://www.care.org/work). 
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3 In 2009, after a five-year trial, the Italian court acquitted the three accused from all charges, recognizing that they had 
acted for humanitarian reasons and not for profit. 
4 Before, during and after Mare Nostrum, however, there have been also many periods and different places in which the 
Italian authorities have given up forcible fingerprinting, either because of the resistance opposed by migrants (Lendaro 
2015) or in order to avoid the consequences of the Dublin regulation. 
5 Significantly, the Italian government didn’t make any attempt to publicize the resettlement, probably fearing domestic 
criticism from the right-wing opposition. Therefore, the interpretation of humanitarian action as a fig leaf for inhuman 
border policies would be flawed in this case. 
6 The most significant example of the institutional popularisation of humanitarian intervention through the public media 
is probably ‘La scelta di Catia’, a documentary co-produced by Rai and Corriere della Sera (Burchielli 2014). 
